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Introduction
Over the second half of the 1990s, the surfacing of credit 
derivatives and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
enlarged the range of more traditional instruments for 
transferring credit risk, such as bank guarantees, loan 
sales or securitization. The market for the new instru-
ments has experienced extremely rapid growth. Although 
no comprehensive aggregate data on credit derivatives 
exposures exist  (1), the value of these exposures is esti-
mated to reach 4.8 trillion USD by 2004, compared with 
an estimated value of 187 billion USD in 1997  (2). Whereas 
the characteristics and purposes of the new instruments 
(to transfer and manage risk) are very similar to those of 
the traditional instruments, the tradability of the new 
instruments has resulted in the creation of global markets 
for credit risk transfer (CRT).
Such CRT markets are of great interest as regards ﬁ  nan-
cial stability  : while offering extended risk management 
opportunities for market participants, they also alter 
“traditional” relationships (between lenders and borrow-
ers), as well as creating new types of relationships (lend-
ers and credit protection sellers). All of these dimensions 
are worth addressing both from a micro and a macro 
perspective.
Until now, rather limited research has been undertaken 
on CRT markets. Available work focuses on speciﬁ  c instru-
ments (such as credit default swaps, CDSs) and issues, 
such as the relationship between CDSs and loan sales, the 
pricing of structured portfolio products, or the regulatory 
treatment of products (see Banque de France, 2002). A 
report by the CGFS working group on Credit Risk Transfer 
(2003) is one of the only studies that addresses CRT mar-
kets as a whole. Its purpose is to provide a broad review 
of how CRT markets effectively work and what role they 
now play in the global ﬁ  nancial system, including available 
instruments, market participants, market dynamics, and 
regulatory issues.
The present review, which has evolved out of work ﬁ  rst 
begun in conjunction with the CGFS group, also aims at 
addressing ﬁ  nancial stability implications of all types of 
CRT instruments. However, its speciﬁ  city is to review 
this issue from an analytical standpoint. Relying on 
existing theoretical and empirical work as well as on con-
tacts with market practitioners, it proposes an analysis of 
the various available CRT instruments and markets and 
possible avenues for further work. In particular, it analy-
ses characteristics of differing CRT instruments in light of 
risk management and asymmetric information problems 
arising in ﬁ  nancial markets.
*  This paper has been simultaneously published in the Financial Stability Review of 
the Banque de France, June 2003.
(1)  See the report of the CGFS working group on Credit Risk Transfer (CGFS, 2003) for 
a discussion of differing data sources, covering various segments of the market.
(2)  These estimates are taken from regular surveys conducted by the British Bankers 
Association. A recent study by Fitch Ratings of 147 ﬁ  nancial institutions active 
in credit derivatives markets ﬁ  nds the total value of credit derivatives exposures 
of these institutions to equal 1.3 trillion USD. However, as shown in the BIS CRT 
report, there was a great difference in 2001 between private calculations (about 
1.2 trillion USD) and the BIS triennial survey on derivatives (about 700 billion USD). 
As the main market players are taken into account in all sources, the reason for 
such a huge difference could arise from the fact that the BIS survey eliminates 
double-counting (as it identiﬁ  es  reporting  institutions’ exposure vis-à-vis other 
reporting institutions) so as to really identify the amount of underlying credit risk.126
Four questions are successively addressed in four sections.
• A ﬁ  rst question relates to CRT instrument characteris-
tics : for what purposes are these products designed; 
why use one instrument rather than another  ? It is 
frequently the case that a given risk management func-
tion could be served by more than one type of CRT 
instrument, but market activity makes it clear that some 
instruments are more equal than others. This may be 
because a large number of market participants have 
similar interests or, alternatively, because of the high 
degree of standardisation of certain instruments.
• A second question raised by these instruments is : now 
that CRT markets exist, who assesses credit risk? The 
existence of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries is generally under-
stood to be motivated by the role they play in reducing 
asymmetric information in ﬁ   nancial markets. In this 
regard, it is worth considering how CRT instruments 
impact this role and what the resulting implications 
are for ﬁ  nancial stability. One could ask if, in transfer-
ring credit risk to third parties, lenders/credit protection 
buyers also transfer responsibility for credit risk assess-
ment to new participants (credit protection sellers) and 
whether the latter are in a position to perform this 
function adequately. Practice appears to suggest that a 
certain degree of pressure exists within CRT markets for 
arrangements that provide banks with the incentive to 
continue performing credit assessment.
• This leads to a third question :  How are CRT instru-
ments priced in practice  ? Does pricing accurately or 
primarily reﬂ  ect credit risk and does it also incorporate 
additional elements, such as counterparty, documenta-
tion or market risks  ? We present general principles 
which are used for pricing marketable instruments and 
show that, although pricing of single-name instruments 
is rather straightforward, pricing of multi-name instru-
ments is more difﬁ  cult and relies on assumptions whose 
robustness has not been thoroughly tested so far. This 
suggests that prices of multi-name instruments may not 
accurately reﬂ  ect the risk of these instruments.
• Finally, even if credit risk is correctly assessed and fairly 
reﬂ  ected in CRT prices, it is worth considering whether 
CRT markets may have other, macro-level implica-
tions. In particular, as the existence of CRT instruments 
enlarges the population of participants involved in the 
credit risk market, one could ask whether there is a 
chance that CRT markets will result in more or less 
credit risk in the ﬁ  nancial system, or in a  better 
allocation of credit risk. Given the relative youth of 
these markets, it is not surprising that these questions 
remain at this stage largely open ones.
1.  Why use CRT Markets and 
Instruments?
CRT instruments help to complete credit markets by allowing 
market participants to separate credit risk from other types 
of risk. This leads to the creation of markets for credit risk, 
through which lenders may shed credit risk (e.g., for hedg-
ing purposes) and non-lenders may take on credit risk (e.g., 
allowing access to new categories of risk). In fact, numerous 
examples of the beneﬁ  ts of CRT instruments in dealing with 
different dimensions of credit risk can be identiﬁ  ed.
These include the following :
• Separation of credit risk from funding risk and market 
risk.
• Isolation of time dimensions of credit risk.
• Separation of classes of credit risk, which allows match-
ing levels of risk and risk appetites.
• Allowing banks to choose whether to retain ownership 
when transferring credit risk, which permits specialisa-
tion, “unbundling” of loan origination from credit risk, 
and easing of regulatory constraints.
The various available instruments provide different solu-
tions for risk management, funding, regulatory capital and 
balance sheet disclosure. One of the questions addressed 
in this paper is the extent to which certain instruments 
might be better suited to particular transactions than 
others or whether some of these instruments are close 
substitutes.  Two tables in the Appendix present a 
classiﬁ  cation scheme for single-name and portfolio 
CRT instruments based on their relevant economic 
features  (3). Depending on the pursued objective, some 
speciﬁ  c CRT instruments with relevant characteristics may 
prove more useful than others.
The credit protection buyer’s preference is often to take the 
credit risk off the balance sheet and thus reduce its funding 
requirements as well as its risk. The appendix tables show 
that this can only occur via a loan sale, or the issuance 
of either an asset-backed security (ABS) or a collateralised 
debt obligation (CDO). However, if the underlying asset is 
not transferable (either for legal or customer-relations rea-
sons  (4)), synthetic transfer instruments (i.e., those involving 
credit derivatives) must be used; the latter encompass credit 
(3)  These tables are also referred to in Sections 2 and 3 and to a lesser extent in 
Section 4 below.
(4)  See the discussion in Section 2.1.2 for more detail on the whys and wherefores of 
transferability.127
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default swaps (CDSs), credit-linked notes (CLNs), total rate 
of return swaps (TRORs) and synthetic CDOs.
A portfolio approach becomes the preferred shedding alter-
native when transfer of individual credits is too expensive. 
While market participants often report that single-name 
CDSs are expensive, Rule (2001) speculates that information 
asymmetries may be a cost factor  (5). Among the portfolio 
CRT instruments, the synthetic structures seem to be grow-
ing in popularity. J.P. Morgan (2001) attributes some of this 
to the combination of low funding costs for active banks in 
that market and relatively high yields in conventional ABS/
CDO markets, even on AAA tranches. Also, this study points 
out that in most countries conventional securitisation cannot 
be applied to undrawn commitments (like revolving credit 
lines, liquidity facilities or future receivables).
A ﬁ  nal important decision factor is the degree of regulatory 
capital relief for credit risk shedders. Although synthetic 
transactions can be structured so that the risk transfers are 
almost perfect, they do not remove the assets from the bal-
ance sheet, which thus limits the reduction of capital require-
ments. Hence, synthetic risk transfer will not be useful if risk 
shedders are seeking funding leverage. Also, the protection 
buyer may face counterparty capital charges on a synthetic 
transfer. For example, capital charge considerations play a 
key role in the design of portfolio CRT instruments that 
are sold in “tranches”. Any risk retained, e.g. in the form 
of ﬁ  rst loss protection, is treated as recourse and is subject 
to a 100% regulatory capital charge. If the amount of risk 
retained is less than 8% of the amount of loans securitised, 
then the bank can reduce its capital charge through securi-
tisation (since if it did not securitise the loans it would have 
to hold 8% in capital). Jones (2000) offers several “prescrip-
tions” for CDO originators that seem consistent with market 
practice  : for example, he recommends that the equity or 
ﬁ  rst-loss tranche is less than 8% of the total risk shed, which 
ﬁ   ts the typical market practice, as the originator usually 
retains between 3% and 5% of such risk.
(5)  Section 2 discusses asymmetries of information in detail.
(6)  “Funding” is deﬁ  ned from the risk shedder’s (credit protection buyer’s) perspective 
and implies that the risk shedder/protection buyer receives funds from the protec-
tion seller at the time of the transaction.
(7)  ABSs and CDOs can be both CRTs and underlying risks as a result of resecuritisa-
tions.
TABLE 1 THE CRT LANDSCAPE
NB: An asset may not be transferable either for legal or customer-relations reasons.





Auto loans and leases
ABS:
underlying risk tends to be “local”. 
That is, there is not a great deal of 
cross-border ABS volume. Also assets 
tend to be less diversified than those 
securitised via CDOs and CLNs Loans transferred 
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Funding from the 














ABSs and CDOs (7)
Loan sale:
(cheapest and cleanest) alternative
CDO:
allows for heterogeneous assets but 




CLNs and synthetic CDOs:
cheaper than conventional CDOs
Loans remain on 
the risk shedder’s 
balance sheet, 
although the CRT 
transaction
qualifies for hedge 
treatment
No funding from 
the risk taker to 
the risk shedder
Single-name credit derivatives 
(CDS), surety bonds 
and guarantees:
standardised (CDS) but rather 
expensive and counterparty risk 
exposure
Multi-name (or basket) 
default swaps:
counterparty risk exposure128
Table 1 summarises how CRT instruments are used, 
including the types of assets which tend to be included 
in multi-name portfolio instruments as opposed to single-
name instruments, and the impact on balance sheets and 
funding. It shows, for example, that credit risk associated 
with consumer loans is typically shed via asset-backed 
securities. Conversely, ABSs tend not to be used to 
securitise corporate debt, leveraged loans and emerging 
market debt, and they cannot be used for non-transfer-
able assets. The table also shows that CDSs and other 
synthetic CRT instruments, like basket default swaps, 
CLNs and synthetic CDOs, can be used when the assets  (8) 
are non transferable.
2.  Do CRT instruments have an 
impact on asymmetric information 
problems ?
A large part of ﬁ   nancial intermediation theory was 
built on the idea that banks, through screening of loan 
applicants and monitoring of borrowers, help to resolve 
problems of asymmetric information between agents 
who possess capital and those who have investment 
projects. It is therefore useful to consider whether the use 
of CRT instruments has an impact on banks‘ performance 
of these functions (do CRT instruments weaken banks’ 
incentives to perform them  ?) and what role protection 
sellers play. While CRT markets help to resolve problems 
of risk management, they indeed may also give rise to 
some new risks in ﬁ  nancial relationships, and they may 
have an impact on pre-existing problems of asymmetric 
information.
This section analyses whether the introduction of CRT 
markets creates new problems and risks  (9). The discus-
sion focuses on the type of problems (moral hazard or 
adverse selection) and relationships (borrower – lender or 
lender – protection seller) – see Box 1. The analysis also 
highlights trade-offs between instruments with respect to 
the identiﬁ  ed problems. The main results are summarised 
in Table 2.
2.1  Borrower - lender relationship
The introduction of CRT markets may actually worsen 
asymmetric information problems in the borrower-lender 
relationship, relative to the state of equilibrium that would 
exist in the absence of such markets. Indeed, authors such 
as Diamond (1984) warned early on that loan sales for 
example can be potentially dangerous, as they could 
weaken a bank’s incentive to perform screening and 
monitoring activities.
2.1.1 Adverse  selection
Insofar as the lender believes that it will be able to hedge 
its exposure on its borrowers (in purchasing credit pro-
tection through CRT once the loan contract is signed), 
the lender may have less or no incentive to screen bor-
rowers. As a result, the adverse selection problem (which 
results in risky borrowers receiving funds and safe ones 
possibly not) may no longer be mitigated by the bank. 
This implies that there may be little or no borrower selec-
tion, since the bank may be willing to provide credit to 
all applicants as long as protection sellers are willing to 
take on the credit risk. However, if the protection sell-
ers in CRT markets conduct their own screening before 
agreeing to sell protection on an exposure, and if they 
have equal access to information and screening tech-
nologies as do lenders, then the problem of weakened 
lender incentives to screen will not arise  : in this case, 
the lender knows that protection sellers will refuse to 
sell protection on “bad” borrowers and he will therefore 
be incited to screen borrowers in order to avoid making 
loans to risky ones.
Reputation offers another potential solution to the 
problem of weakened lender incentives to screen. A 
lender might want to avoid developing a reputation for 
bringing bad loans to the CRT market, in which case 
the lender would continue screening potential borrow-
ers even in the presence of these markets. The desire to 
maintain a good reputation might also motivate lend-
ers to offer implicit guarantees when transferring credit 
risk; i.e., the lender implicitly agrees to reassume some 
of the credit risk if the exposure goes bad. Yet, such 
implicit guarantees might give rise to a new potential 
problem : undercapitalisation. If the lender has purchased 
credit protection via an instrument which removes 
the exposure from the lender’s balance sheet, such as a loan 
sale or securitisation (without any explicit recourse), then 
the lender might not have set aside any capital to cover the 
risk of having to reassume the exposure. Determination of 
the “true” amount of risk that is being removed from 
the bank’s balance sheet in such cases is a relevant 
regulatory concern.
(8)  The relationships between underlying credit risk and CRT mitigants are consist-
ent with market practices as gleaned from various industry publications and 
the authors‘ discussions with market participants. For example, in a recent J.P. 
Morgan ”Banking 101” report (Murray et al (2002)) it was stated that “whereas 
asset-backed securities are bonds backed primarily by consumer loans such as 
credit cards, auto loans, and home equity loans, CLOs / CDOs are bonds backed by 
US high yield debt, emerging market debt, or investment-grade commercial and 
industrial loans or bonds.” There is little theoretical literature that focuses on this 
dimension, although Benston (1992) suggests that conventional securitisation (i.e., 
ABSs and outright sales) is more likely to work for assets for which moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems are not too severe, like pooled home mortgages 
and consumer loans. At the other end of the asymmetric information spectrum, 
he identiﬁ  es commercial and industrial loans, which also ﬁ  ts with the JP Morgan 
report.
(9)  The impact of CRT instruments on asymmetric information problems applies pri-
marily to the loan market and not to the bond market, as information in the latter 
market is more of a public nature.129
CREDIT RISK TRANSFER INSTRUMENTS
Asymmetric information problems in ﬁ  nancial contracting are well acknowledged and inherent to the borrower 
- lender relationship. These problems include adverse selection regarding borrower quality and moral hazard on 
the part of the borrower.
• The adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970) – whereby the lender cannot observe the borrower’s quality 
– may lead to elimination of the safest borrowers from the market(10) or to credit rationing by lenders (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). While adverse selection may lead to the self-elimination of the safest borrowers (because the 
cost of ﬁ  nance is driven up due to the presence of risky borrowers in the loan pool), rationing allows lenders to 
eliminate those which appear as the weakest. Problems of adverse selection can be alleviated by screening of 
the borrower by the lender prior to extending a loan, which enables the lender to learn something about the 
borrower’s type.
• The moral hazard problem exists when the lender cannot costlessly observe the borrower’s actions after a loan 
contract has been signed, and the borrower may take actions that are in his own but not the lender’s interest. 
Problems of moral hazard in the lending relationship can be mitigated by monitoring of the borrower by the 
lender (Diamond, 1984).
Much literature (following Leyland and Pyle, 1977 and Diamond, 1984) has been devoted to understand-
ing the special role played by banks in acquiring “inside” information about borrowers and in mitigat-
ing asymmetric information problems. A long-term relationship with a bank can allow a ﬁ  rm to develop a 
reputation for good quality, thereby beneﬁ  ting from cheaper loan funding and ultimately facilitating access 
to market ﬁ  nance at lower cost – i.e. the idea of a certiﬁ  cation effect (Diamond, 1991). The following 




(*) since the bank is screening and monitoring
asymmetric information
initial relationship
screening, granting credit, then monitoring
reduced asymmetric information (*)
new relationship
more willing to buy debt/stocks
as the first relationship exists
borrower (certification effect)
CASE 1: "NO CRT AND BANKS INCITED TO REDUCE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION"
lender
investors
A related question is whether other agents (such as rating agencies) could assume the same function as banks. 
Diamond (1984) and others (11) argue that banks have a comparative advantage with respect to other market par-
ticipants in this regard, due to the special knowledge they acquire from performing complementary functions on a 
large scale (account keeping of borrowers, provision of payment instruments etc.). Recent work suggests however 
that the advantage of banks tends to decrease for large corporates either because the latter increase transparency 
and disclosure so as to obtain good ratings or to increase their capital market access, or because they develop 
high tech activity which requires sophisticated credit risk assessment skills in the former (Diamond, 1991, Boot and 
Thakor, 1991, 1997)  (12).
The introduction of CRT markets raises the question of whether banks which now beneﬁ  t from hedging opportu-
nities are still incited to screen and monitor credit risk. Diagram 2 illustrates a purely theoretical and extreme case 
where CRT markets are introduced and no one has an incentive to assess credit risk :
(10) Because the lender does not know the quality of the borrower, the lender must 
charge a price to every loan applicant which reﬂ  ects the average quality of the 
borrower pool. If the average quality is low, borrowers with safe projects (low risk, 
low return) may ﬁ  nd the ﬁ  nancing cost too high for the project to be proﬁ  table.
(11) See for example, Nakamura (1993) and Longhafer and Santos (1998).
(12) Considerable empirical evidence nevertheless exists to support claims of the unique 
role that banks play in resolving asymmetric information problems and their 
comparative advantage relative to other market players. This evidence includes 
event studies which ﬁ  nd abnormal stock market returns of ﬁ  rms in response to 
bank announcements of new, renewed, or non-renewed loans or relating to the 
failure of a borrower ﬁ  rm’s  bank. (See Gorton and Winton (2002) for a detailed 
discussion.)
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2.1.2 Moral  hazard
• Moral hazard by borrower.
A lender who has purchased credit protection may 
have less incentive to monitor the borrower than in the 
absence of a CRT market (Gorton and Pennachi, 1995  ; 
Morrison, 2002)  (13). Assuming that other market players 
cannot perform monitoring as well as the bank, a lower 
incentive for bank monitoring would worsen the moral 
hazard problem relative to the state of equilibrium in the 
absence of CRT markets.
Morrison (2002) analyses the problem of weakened 
lender monitoring in the presence of a market for credit 
default swaps. He shows that the existence of a CRT 
market may have a negative impact on welfare relative 
to the absence of such a market. When no CRT market 
exists, banks will monitor borrowers and force them to 
carry out “good” projects (low risk, high proﬁ  tability). 
Firm borrowers beneﬁ  t from this “bank certiﬁ  cation” 
and are able to combine cheaper bond ﬁ  nance  with 
more expensive bank ﬁ  nance for their project  (14). When 
a CRT market is introduced, banks’ purchases of credit 
protection may remove their incentive to monitor bor-
rowers. Because borrowers (and market investors) 
know that they will not be monitored, borrowers no 
longer beneﬁ  t from bank certiﬁ  cation and thus cannot 
use bank ﬁ  nance as a “commitment” to choose a good 
project. Rather, borrowers may now choose to issue 
junk bonds and to choose “bad” projects (risky and 
less proﬁ  table – but yielding high private beneﬁ  ts to the 
borrower). Thus, although at ﬁ  rst glance the possi-
bility for a bank to hedge its loan exposures might 
have been thought to improve welfare, it is pos-
sible that it reduces welfare (since high proﬁ  tability 
projects are no longer being ﬁ  nanced). However, such 
a result does not take into account the need for the 
lender to signal to the protection seller its commitment 
to continue monitoring (see Section 2.2).
• Moral hazard by lender.
A new problem in the borrower – lender relationship 
that may be created by CRT markets is one of lender 
moral hazard. This problem arises when the lender can 
purchase credit protection against the borrower’s wishes 
or without informing him. The potential negative impact 
for the borrower is twofold  : the lender’s purchase of 
credit protection may send a negative signal about the 
borrower’s quality and / or (as discussed above) may pre-
vent the borrower from obtaining the beneﬁ  ts of bank 
In this case asymmetric information problems are not mitigated, and the borrower’s relationship with the lender no 
longer creates a certiﬁ  cation effect. Although in reality the presence of CRT markets creates a situation in between 
the two cases depicted in the above diagrams, one of the purposes of Section 2 is to examine, in a context of 
CRT markets,
-  the extent to which relationships between borrowers and lenders remain close to Case 1 (thanks to some speciﬁ  c 
CRT instrument characteristics) or, on the contrary, move in the direction of Case 2;
-  the extent to which new “Case 1-type” information problems may also arise between lenders and protection 
sellers.














CASE 2: "CRT AND NOBODY INCITED TO REDUCE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION" (HYPOTHETICAL)
(13)  Except if lenders beneﬁ  t so much from the higher expected return generated by 
monitoring that they would choose to purchase only partial protection in the CRT 
market and to continue monitoring the borrower.
(14) Bond ﬁ  nance is assumed to be cheaper than bank ﬁ  nance, since the cost of bank 
ﬁ  nance includes the cost of monitoring activities.131
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certiﬁ  cation.(15) For these reasons, a borrower may be 
opposed to the lender having recourse to CRT markets.
Depending on the type of CRT instrument, the nature and 
impact of the signal generated by the bank’s purchase 
of credit protection on a borrower may vary. Important 
instrument characteristics include the balance sheet 
impact; i.e., whether the instrument allows a full transfer 
of the underlying exposure (e.g., a loan sale or securitisa-
tion) versus only hedging of credit risk (credit derivatives, 
guarantees), and whether the lender retains some expo-
sure (i.e. is not entirely hedged in case of a single name 
or retains a ﬁ  rst loss position for portfolios). If the lender 
retains a large enough exposure, then the incen-
tive to monitor will not be weakened and the signal 
regarding the borrower will be less (if at all) negative.
The severity of this problem is of course also inﬂ  uenced by 
the  observability or transparency of the bank’s purchase 
of credit protection (which relates to the bank’s reporting 
requirements for use of CRT instruments or to requirements 
to notify the borrower). As Morrison (2002) points out, if the 
bank’s purchase of credit protection is observable, then the 
amount of credit protection to be ultimately purchased by 
the bank may be negotiated with the borrower at the time 
of signing of the loan contract. For example, loan sales gen-
erally require notiﬁ  cation of the borrower and are therefore 
observable. On the other hand, banks often prefer credit 
default swaps, as they do not require notiﬁ  cation of the bor-
rower and thus cannot be detected by the borrower. The 
problem of lender moral hazard is thus more severe 
when unobservable instruments (such as CDSs) are 
used to transfer credit risk than when loan sales are used. 
As a remedy for this problem, Morrison proposes imposing 
reporting requirements on the use of CDSs.
The context in which the instrument is used also plays an 
important role with respect to the problem of lender moral 
hazard vis-à-vis the borrower. Credit insurance, ﬁ  nancial 
guarantee insurance, and surety bonds are, for instance, 
typically sought by the borrower, in the creditor’s interest, 
from a third party prior to the signing of the loan contract. In 
this case, the protection seller will often screen the borrower 
prior to agreeing to sell protection. Thus, use of these types 
of CRT instruments is not expected to send a negative qual-
ity signal (and on the contrary should send a positive one) 
about the borrower. In addition, if these instruments include 
clauses requiring the bank to monitor the borrower, the bor-
rower should not lose the bank certiﬁ  cation effect.
A second form of lender moral hazard arises in cases 
in which it may be in the interest of the lender, once it 
has purchased credit protection, to prematurely trigger a 
credit event. Although this problem is discussed below in 
the context of the lender - protection seller relationship, 
it may also adversely affect the borrower through, for 
example, negative reputational effects associated with 
restructuring or bankruptcy.
2.2  Lender - Protection seller relationship.
2.2.1 Adverse  selection
Lenders might have an incentive to buy credit protection 
for their lowest-quality assets. This will not necessarily 
create a problem for protection sellers, as long as they are 
able to price CRT instruments to accurately reﬂ  ect the low 
asset quality. Conversely, to the extent that protection sell-
ers’ knowledge of asset quality is inaccurate or that pricing 
is difﬁ  cult, then an adverse selection problem might arise. 
In addition, high CRT prices due to adverse selection may 
prevent lenders with good-quality assets from purchasing 
protection for those assets (Duffee and Zhou, 2001). These 
questions are also addressed in Section 3 on pricing.
In a manner similar to the above discussion, the context in 
which the instrument is used could inﬂ  uence the severity 
of this problem. That is, the use of instruments (such as 
guarantees) for which credit protection is obtained 
from a third party by the borrower prior to the sign-
ing of the loan contract may help avoid the problem, 
although it may also affect the ﬁ  nancing conditions faced 
by weaker borrowers. In this case, the protection seller 
may conduct its own screening of borrowers.
Inclusion of due diligence clauses in credit protection 
contracts, whereby the lender must provide to the protec-
tion seller all relevant information relating to the borrower, 
could also help mitigate the adverse selection. The advan-
tages of such tailor-made clauses may, however, be coun-
ter-balanced by higher legal and documentation risks  (16) 
with these instruments relative to standardised ones, which 
tend to involve a limited number of simple clauses.
Relying on external ratings – by selling credit protection 
only on rated assets or on blue-chip ﬁ  rms – may be another 
way for protection sellers to solve the adverse selection 
problem. Some support for this idea is provided by the 
observations that the market for single-name CDSs is largely 
(15)  It is, however, worth noting that the certiﬁ  cation effect may not be the only rel-
evant consideration. Professionals generally cite two main reasons for borrowers 
to be opposed to the transfer of their loans: i) borrowers traditionally think of 
their loans as private transactions and do not wish to give too much publicity to 
their ﬁ  nancing structure and indebtedness; ii) in a case of a restructuring, borrow-
ers prefer to deal with an identiﬁ  ed counterparty than with a large number of 
unknown holders of their debt. Such an attitude is also reported in Caouette et al. 
(1998) and cited in Morrison (2002). This widespread belief of practitioners might 
well be wrong. Alternatively, the certiﬁ  cation effect may be of lesser importance 
than academics traditionally think.
(16) Documentation and legal risk represent an important category of risks linked to 
the incomplete nature of contracts. (See Section 3.3 for discussion.)132
limited to rated ﬁ  rms and that this market is liquid primarily 
for blue-chip ﬁ  rms. Similarly, asset-backed securities (such as 
CLOs and CDOs) are rated prior to sale or may be restricted 
to rated names. Limiting sales of credit protection to rated 
products should help alleviate the problem of adverse selec-
tion  (17), because even if the individual names in the portfolio 
are not rated, the rating agency will have assessed the qual-
ity of the assets included in the portfolio in order to assign a 
rating (to the entire portfolio or to the tranches). Yet, prob-
lems of adverse selection even in rated portfolio products 
such as CDOs are increasingly acknowledged by market 
participants and rating agencies alike, and rating agencies 
are currently conducting empirical studies to quantify the 
impact of adverse selection on CDO riskiness  (18).
The usefulness of tranched portfolio structures (like CDOs, 
CLNs and basket swaps) might also relate to the severity of the 
adverse selection problem. DeMarzo and Dufﬁ  e (1999) have 
shown that pooling and tranching may be optimal when the 
lender / credit risk shedder has superior information. DeMarzo 
and Dufﬁ  e argue that the tranching process allows the 
lender  /  risk shedder to concentrate the “adverse selec-
tion risk premium” in the small ﬁ   rst-loss or equity 
tranches and create relatively large, low-risk senior 
tranches. Also, the lender/shedder’s retention of the subor-
dinate tranches reduces the total adverse selection problem 
by aligning the interests of the lender/risk shedder and the
investors.
Duffee and Zhou (2001) have described another set of cir-
cumstances in which the adverse selection problem might be 
less severe. If there exists a time period (probably early in the 
life of a loan contract) during which no asymmetric informa-
tion exists between the lender and outsiders regarding the 
borrower’s probability of default, then the lender’s purchase 
of credit protection during this period could not result from 
an adverse selection problem. Any CRT instrument for which 
coverage could be limited to this time period could be used. 
On the other hand, an instrument such as a loan sale or a CLO 
(without any accompanying repurchase agreement), which 
removes the asset from the lender’s balance sheet, implicitly 
represents a purchase of credit protection up to maturity of 
the asset and would thus not avoid the problem.
2.2.2 Moral  hazard
• Moral hazard by the lender
CRT instruments potentially embody several possibilities for 
moral hazard by the lender vis-à-vis the protection seller.
A ﬁ  rst potential problem is one in which, as mentioned 
above, the lender stops monitoring the borrower once 
the lender’s exposure is fully hedged  /  transferred :  the 
protection seller cannot costlessly observe whether the 
lender still monitors or not. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) 
analyse this problem in the case of the loan sales market, 
which experienced rapid development in the 1980s. As a 
result of the moral hazard problem, loan buyers should 
be expected to require high returns and, insofar as a bank 
enjoys low funding costs, it has no incentive to sell loans. 
In the 1980s, however, deregulation and stricter capital 
requirements increased competition within the banking 
sector and raised funding costs, providing banks with 
greater incentives to resort to loan sales. Yet, because of 
the moral hazard problem with respect to lender monitor-
ing, loan sale contracts needed to be made “incentive 
compatible” – i.e., providing the lender with incentives to 
continue monitoring.
Two potential mechanisms cited by Gorton and Pennacchi 
for preserving incentive compatibility are  : implicit 
guarantees  (as described above) and retention of a 
portion of the loan by the originating bank. Gorton 
and Pennacchi found, in tests on a sample of about 
900 individual loan sales, that banks selling loans con-
vinced loan buyers of their commitment to monitor 
borrowers by retaining a portion of the loans. The 
riskier were the loans, the higher was the observed 
portion retained.
Characteristics of CRT instruments that inﬂ  uence  the 
severity of this problem are, therefore, whether the lender 
retains some exposure (which most instruments allow) and 
whether  the instrument is standardised  /  tradable. With 
respect to the issue of standardisation, one advantage 
of non-standardised instruments –  such as credit-linked 
notes, credit insurance, surety bonds, or bank guarantees –
is that they allow a protection seller to include clauses in 
the contract requiring the lender to undertake monitoring 
activities. This obviously induces the lender to monitor. 
In contrast, standardised and tradable instruments such 
as credit default swaps or collateralised debt obligations 
cannot allow such individually tailored provisions.
Thus, it may be the case that non-tradable CRT instru-
ments perform better than traded instruments with 
respect to the problem of reduced lender monitoring.
However, these instruments also entail greater docu-
mentation and legal risks than standardised ones. 
Furthermore, protection sellers using these traditional 
instruments must possess enough information about the 
borrower and/or the lender, so as to be able to verify 
(17) At least if the bank has no private information that is not reﬂ  ected in the rating −  
which may be a strong assumption.
(18) Because a given rating may include ﬁ  rms with varying probabilities of default, an 
adverse selection problem can still arise in a portfolio of rated assets: within any 
given rating category, the lender can include the ﬁ  rms with the higher probabilities 
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whether the latter has properly monitored the former. 
This may restrict the number of potential protection sell-
ers who can use traditional instruments. Finally, enforce-
ability of monitoring clauses in CRT contracts may be 
difﬁ  cult.
A second potential problem in terms of moral hazard by 
the lender is that the lender who has purchased credit 
protection on a loan may have an incentive to prematurely 
trigger a credit event, such as a restructuring of the loan, 
if it is in its interest to do so. Whether this problem arises 
depends upon the nature of the trigger events speciﬁ  ed 
in the credit protection contract. An interesting example 
is given by the case of Conseco in September  2000, 
where the borrower faced a restructuring of its debt 
without going bankrupt  (19). In this case the lender was 
able to realise a two-fold beneﬁ  t  : payment by the pro-
tection seller (against delivery of the cheapest assets the 
lender could ﬁ  nd on the market) and redemption of the 
restructured loans.
Whereas CDSs have in the past included credit 
events which some observers have judged to be 
too broad with respect to the notion of default 
(such as restructuring and acceleration)  (20),  ﬁ  nan-
cial guarantee insurance and bank guarantees are 
only triggered upon nonpayment by the borrower. 
Use of the latter types of instruments or inclusion
of a narrower set of credit events in CDSs may prevent
the moral hazard problem from arising.
A third potential problem of moral hazard by the lender 
may arise with respect to managed securitised portfo-
lios :  (21) in arrangements that allow for substitution of 
(for instance) maturing assets, the lender may have 
the incentive to substitute lower quality assets for the 
maturing ones. Arrangements which establish inde-
pendent management boards and stipulate strict 
rules for substitution can minimise this risk. This 
problem represents a current area of concern among 
market participants, and there is ongoing discussion of 
the appropriate design of managerial compensation con-
tracts for aligning the interests of the portfolio manager 
with those of the investors.
• Moral hazard by protection seller
The protection seller might delay payment, refuse to pay, 
or litigate the claim when a credit event is triggered  (22). It 
is a fact that insurance companies regularly verify (some-
times through extended procedures) a claim’s materiality 
before paying, which delays payment. Indeed, rating 
agencies have begun issuing ratings of insurance compa-
nies’ willingness to pay  (23).
Whether the instrument is funded or unfunded is a 
critical feature of CRT instruments in relation to this 
problem.  The use of funded instruments, such as 
credit-linked notes, CDOs and loan sales prevents 
the moral hazard problem from developing, since 
protection sellers must provide the funds up front, 
prior to any default by the borrower. Conversely, for 
unfunded instruments, the form of settlement following 
the trigger event becomes an important consideration. 
Whereas credit default swaps specify payment by the 
protection seller upon the triggering of the credit event, 
instruments such as credit insurance and surety bonds 
allow the protection seller (usually an insurance com-
pany) to investigate the losses before making payment. 
Instruments such as ﬁ  nancial guarantees, by which the 
guarantor (protection seller) assumes the payments to 
the lender (bank) and at the same time takes over the 
claim on the borrower, would also appear to limit the 
risk of moral hazard by the protection seller.
2.3  Trade-offs between CRT instruments
The above discussion of the differences in CRT instru-
ment characteristics and the trade-offs between 
instruments points to an open question  : is there an 
“optimal” form of CRT contract – i.e. a single contract 
that minimises the cost for all types of asymmetric 
information problems? For example, is the CRT instru-
ment that best resolves the adverse selection problem 
between the lender and the protection seller also the 
instrument that best addresses the problem of the 
lender’s reduced incentives to monitor borrowers once 
credit protection has been purchased ? Although formal 
analysis of the trade-offs between CRT instruments in 
differing circumstances is still at its earliest stages, the 
optimal form of CRT contract would appear to depend 
upon the nature of the problems existing in ﬁ  nancial 
relationships.
(19) Conseco’s bankers granted it additional credit in order to help it avoid bankruptcy. 
As this was technically considered as a restructuring, the banks were able to 
activate their credit protection, and they delivered long-dated Conseco bonds 
to protection sellers. Such a case was part of the reason why ISDA issued a new 
standard contract with a restructuring clause. However, this contract is not univer-
sally used.
(20) Acceleration is the lender’s exercise of its contractual right, under certain circum-
stances, to declare a debt immediately due and payable.
(21) Initially, portfolio CRT instruments were static, or “unmanaged”; i.e., the matu-
rity of the instrument corresponded to the maturities of the assets included in 
the portfolio. More recently, however, many portfolio instruments have become 
dynamic, or managed. The managers of these portfolios are allowed to substitute 
new assets for the maturing exposures within the portfolio. Substitution may also 
occur for other reasons, such as replacing an asset which has been downgraded or 
even re-designing the content of the basket according to some general contractu-
ally agreed upon guidelines. 
(22)  This situation should be distinguished from one where the protection seller 
defaults on its obligation to the protection buyer because of unanticipated ﬁ  nan-
cial distress. The latter situation would not be classiﬁ  ed as a problem of moral 
hazard by the seller. 
(23) Standard  &  Poor’s began issuing Financial Enhancement Ratings for insurance 
companies in 2000. These ratings include an assessment of an insurance compa-
ny’s willingness, as well as its capacity, to pay to in CRT contracts.134
Differences between standardised  /  tradable and 
non-standardised instruments will likely be impor-
tant to any assessment of the design of CRT contracts. 
Non-standardised instruments allow for contracts to 
be tailored to particular lenders’ circumstances or 
to borrower – lender relationships. Yet, these same 
instruments appear to leave the lender more vulner-
able to protection seller moral hazard and to legal or 
documentation risk. In addition, too large a diversity in 
tailor-made CRT instruments may give rise to extended 
risk management concerns on the sides of both the 
protection buyer and protection seller. Standardisation 
of CRT contracts lowers documentation risk in the 
lender - protection seller relationship. Thanks to the 
efforts of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), CDSs now represent one of the 
most standardised forms of contracts  (24). Reduction of 
documentation risk, however, appears to come at the 
expense of greater inefﬁ  ciency owing to problems of 
asymmetric information.
3.  How are CRT instruments priced in 
practice ?
CRT market participants naturally have to accurately 
assess credit risk. However, the question is  : what do 
they do in practice? CRT markets are of utmost inter-
est from a risk management perspective  : not only do 
they allow a lender to insure itself against a borrower’s 
default (and the possible resulting ﬁ  nancial  distress), 
but they allow an institution to add credit risk, where 
appropriate, by selling protection. Therefore, for the 
credit risk transfer to effectively occur, both parties 
must agree on a price that is based (among other 
things) on the intrinsic credit risk of the underlying 
asset. In addition, both counterparties to such transac-
tions have to deal with other risks that are bundled in 
the CRT instrument : market risk, counterparty risk and 
documentation risk.
(24) However, even after the introduction of its “modiﬁ  ed restructuring” clause, the 
deﬁ  nition of credit events remains uncertain (as shown in June 2002, when Xerox 
renegotiated a credit facility). A group of insurers asked ISDA to clear up whether 
debt restructuring triggers a default swap after a group of New York swap dealers 
agreed to pay. (Bream, 2002)
TABLE 2 POTENTIAL CRT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ISSUES
Potential Problem Affected Relationship Instrument characteristics offering 
potential solutions
Adverse Selection Reduced incentives for lender 
to screen loan applicants
Borrower – Lender
Lender – Protection seller
• Credit enhancements provided 
by lender
• Partial risk retention by lender
Adverse selection problem:
lender buys protection on low-quality 
assets, drives up cost of protection 
on high-quality assets
Lender – Protection seller • Independent evaluation (e.g. ratings)
• Protect only near-term risks
Incentives for asset manager 
to select low-quality assets 
(managed securitisations)
Lender – Protection seller • Independent governance
• Strict asset selection rules
• Partial risk retention by manager
Moral Hazard Reduced incentives for lender 
to monitor loans
Borrower – Lender
Lender – Protection seller
• Credit enhancements provided 
by lender
• Partial risk retention by lender
• Monitoring provisions 
in documentation
Increased incentives for lender 
to prematurely trigger defaults
Borrower – Lender
Lender – Protection seller
• Narrowly defined default triggers
Protection seller reneges 
(partially or fully) 
on contingent payouts
Lender – Protection seller • Objective trigger definitions
• Use of funded CRTs
Borrower deprived 
of “bank certification” because of use 
of nontransparent CRT instruments
Borrower – Lender • Increased transparency of all CRT 
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Basically, credit derivatives are ﬁ  nancial instruments that 
allow the “trading” of credit risk by isolating it from other 
kinds of risks such as interest rate and currency risk. As a 
result, should the market be perfectly liquid and ﬂ  exible, 
the value of the default protection should relate to the 
spread between the yield on the underlying debtor bonds 
and the cost of funding the purchase of such bonds. 
However, one still has to determine the true price of the 
underlying asset. This could be quite straightforward if the 
underlying bond or loan is traded in a transparent market, 
but if not, more sophisticated modeling approaches must 
be used. In addition, there is a risk that CRT instrument 
price dynamics diverge from those of the underlying 
assets (“basis risk”).
Basis risk relates to hedge imperfections caused by vari-
ous technical factors. Kessler and Levenstein (2001) call 
particular attention to the technical differences between 
ﬁ  nancial guarantees (where default events are very nar-
rowly deﬁ  ned) and default swaps (where default events 
can cover a wide range of situations). Other more 
fundamental reasons can cause the price behaviour of 
CRT instruments to diverge from that of the underlying 
assets. O’Kane and McAdie (2001) show how factors 
such as funding cost differentials, delivery options, and 
regulations can cause cash market and CDS spreads to 
diverge. More generally, unexpected price changes can 
result in less than perfect hedging, so hedgers should 
have a solid understanding of CRT price dynamics. 
Beyond the underlying credit risk, a remaining question 
is whether market prices adequately reﬂ  ect counterparty 
and documentation risk. Market risk is not explicitly cov-
ered here, since there is already a large body of litera-
ture that discusses the use of interest rate and currency 
derivatives for mitigating it.
As the next subsections will show, there is a fairly mature 
and well understood single-name CRT instrument pricing 
literature. However, multi-name portfolio CRT instrument 
pricing appears to be still very much work in progress.
3.1  Pricing Single-Name CRT Instruments
Among single-name credit derivatives, CDSs are the most 
commonly traded instruments, as well as the simplest 
ones from a conceptual viewpoint : they are relatively well 
standardised contracts that provide protection against the 
risk of default of a given debtor. Loan sales and syndica-
tion are not covered here, since by their very nature, prices 
are directly observable to market participants. In addition, 
other tradable “synthetic” CRT instruments like total rate 
of return swaps (TRORS) and single-name credit-linked 
notes (CLNs) are not explicitly covered since their price 
dynamics derive so directly from those of CDSs. Also, 
“insurance-type” instruments (e.g., surety bonds and 
guarantees) are not discussed, since they are not, in gen-
eral, tradable, although their pricing dynamics would be 
very similar to those of CDSs.
The pricing of any synthetic CRT instruments is closely 
tied to funding costs, the TRORS being the most obvi-
ous case, since its risk-return proﬁ  le is virtually identical 
to that of a “cash” position in the underlying asset. In 
the TRORS case, the periodic fee should lie somewhere 
between the funding costs of the two counterparties. 
The link to funding costs for CDSs is somewhat more 
complex because only credit risk is being transferred, 
but Dufﬁ  e (1999) and Bomﬁ  m (2002) show that, in a 
market in which all participants are assumed to fund 
themselves in ﬂ  oating rates at LIBOR, the premium on 
a single-name CDS is equal to the spread (over LIBOR) 
on a maturity-matched ﬂ  oating-rate note issued by the 
underlying entity. Even in the absence of an underlying 
ﬂ  oating-rate note, a maturity-matched ﬁ  xed-rate bond 
issued by the same entity can be swapped into a syn-
thetic  ﬂ   oating-rate note for pricing purposes (i.e., an 
“asset swap”). This methodology is sometimes called 
the replication approach  (25).
Houweling and Vorst (2001) show that CDS spreads 
derive directly from the replication approach for 
investment-grade credits but that they are wider than 
asset swap spreads for credits rated below “A”. O’Kane 
and McAdie (2001) run through some of the factors that 
might lead to such spread divergence :
• Factors that increase default swap spreads include the 
protection seller’s exposure to counterparty risk, “tech-
nical default” risks caused by the CDS’s typically broader 
default deﬁ  nitions and the delivery option usually held 
by the protection buyer. (Typically, the protection buyer 
can choose from a basket of deliverables in the event 
of a “default”.) Also, CDS spreads tend to be wider in 
the less liquid parts of the curve – for example, in the 
three- to ﬁ  ve-year area. In addition, CDS spreads tend 
to be wider if the cheapest-to-deliver bond is trading 
below par.
(25) The replication approach to valuing default risk is also consistent with the market’s 
practice of valuing corporate liabilities off the swap curve, rather than government 
bond yield curves. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), and Elton et al. 
(2001) and Rappoport (2001) show that conventional (versus government bond 
yield) corporate bond yield spreads have little connection to credit-risk factors. In 
addition, Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001) show that swap contracts are virtu-
ally devoid of credit risk, and Liu et al. (2000) show that changes in the spreads 
between swap and US government bond yields are little inﬂ  uenced by credit-risk 
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• Factors that decrease CDS spreads include the protec-
tion buyer’s exposure to counterparty risk and the fact 
that most market participants fund themselves above 
LIBOR  (26).
Although numerous more “fundamental” approaches 
have been developed for situations where replication 
does not work, the differences between “defaults” 
and “technical defaults” (or “soft defaults”) is worth 
emphasising (see Section 3.3).
Theoretical models can be called on to replace or validate 
the prices generated by replication. The theoretical single-
name models can be segregated into two distinct groups :
• Structural models based on ideas presented by Merton 
(1974) and operationalised by KMV and CreditMetrics 
(a detailed explanation of the Merton model is given 
in Lubochinsky, 2002 and the KMV model is described 
in Crouhy et al., 2003). In these models, credit risk 
is modeled in terms of the ﬁ  rm’s assets relative to its 
liabilities. Pan (2001) and Finger (2002) have applied 
this approach to CDS pricing. However, structural 
models have only limited applicability to the pricing 
of credit risk on sovereign bonds  (27), and they seem 
to have difﬁ  culties with modeling ﬁ  nancial institution 
credit risk  (28). Also, empirical tests of structural model 
bond pricing have not been overly promising  (29).
• Reduced-form models which associate credit risk with 
exogenous events that can be modeled with statisti-
cal tools most often associated with actuarial science. 
Essentially, they relate credit derivative prices to distribu-
tions of default probabilities and recovery amounts. The 
theoretical underpinnings of this approach have been 
laid out in Jarrow et al. (1997) and Dufﬁ  e and Singleton 
(1999). The approach has been applied to credit deriva-
tives by (among others) Acharya et al. (2002), Cheng 
(2001), Hull and White (2000 and 2001).
Anecdotal evidence would suggest that structural 
models have the upper hand for pricing single-
name default swaps on trading desks, given the 
important role that KMV and CreditMetrics play on 
the risk management side. However, the only academic 
empirical research that has actually been published 
to date (Houweling and Vorst, 2001) focuses on a 
reduced-form model. Several recent papers (Altman 
et al., 2001, and Delianedis and Lagnado, 2002) have 
also called attention to the sensitivity of reduced-form 
credit derivative pricing models to the assumptions 
made about post-default recovery values. Three dif-
ferent parameters may be used in this respect  : 1) the 
market value of the risky debt prior to default (RMV), 
2) the market value of an otherwise similar riskless debt 
instrument (RT), and 3) the risky debt’s face value (RFV). 
Delianedis and Lagnado (2002) show that the RMV and 
RT assumptions produce very similar risk-neutral default 
probabilities and default swap prices, whereas the RFV 
assumption tends to underestimate probabilities and 
overestimate swap prices, particularly on longer-dated 
speculative-grade credits. Indeed, this was conﬁ  rmed 
by Houweling and Vorst (2001), who use the RFV 
assumption  (30).
There is very little literature devoted to the pricing of 
credit spread put options, largely due to the small size 
of this segment of the credit derivatives market, and 
also because the contracts are far from standardised. 
McDermott (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and 
Das and Sundaram (2000) effectively apply the Black 
(1976) commodity option pricing model to put options 
on forward yield spreads. However, another spread put 
variation, which gives the holder the right to sell the risky 
bond at the strike spread, has been modeled by Dufﬁ  e 
and Singleton (1999) and Schonbucher (2000).
3. 2  Pricing Portfolio CRT Instruments
There is not really an ABS theoretical pricing litera-
ture  (31), but the CDO pricing literature is growing rapidly. 
However, in either case, the empirical work is very lean. 
Two key conclusions stand out in almost all of the studies 
devoted to multi-name instruments :
• Default risk explains such a small part of observed cor-
porate bond spreads that there are serious doubts as to 
whether those spreads could be used in a multi-name 
product pricing model  (32).
(26) Working the other way, to some extent, is the fact that high-grade sovereigns and 
supranationals swap into sub-LIBOR asset swap levels. Since default swap spreads 
cannot be negative, there should be a positive bias versus asset swap spreads.
(27)  Westphalen (2002) develops a structural-like model that accounts for some of 
the factors that make sovereign debt different from corporate debt. These unique 
factors revolve mainly around the greater incentives for sovereigns to strategically 
default and the impossibility of taking a sovereign borrower to bankruptcy court.
(28)  Finger (2002) points out that the typically high leverage of banks and ﬁ  nance 
ﬁ  rms results in structural models signiﬁ  cantly overestimating credit default swap 
spreads. He posits that actual spreads are tighter for these sectors because banks 
beneﬁ  t from government oversight and implicit guarantees, plus their effective 
leverage is much lower than what it appears to be on the surface, because so 
many of their assets are secured.
(29) See Eom et al. (2002) for a recent empirical test of various structural bond pricing 
models and a summary of other empirical work. They conclude that some models 
are more accurate than others but accuracy is still lacking. Nevertheless, Campbell 
and Taksler (2002) show that the structural model idea of linking the price of credit 
risk to equity values is not altogether without merit, particularly for highly lever-
aged ﬁ  rms.
(30)  Hayt (2000) had suggested that default swap prices should be insensitive to 
recovery rate assumptions, but his argument holds only in a single-period world 
with only one claim type. Delianedis and Lagnado (2002) extended the analysis to 
multiple periods and claim types (bonds and default swaps).
(31)  Childs et al. (1996) used a contingent-claims pricing methodology to examine 
mortgage-backed securities pricing dynamics, but they did not attempt to test it 
empirically.
(32)  See Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Elton, et al. (2001), Rappoport (2001) and 
Lubochinsky (2002).137
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• Defaults are rare and extreme events, which makes it 
difﬁ  cult to estimate default correlations.
Market ABS pricing practice seems to revolve around 
either the inferred-rating approach or option-adjusted 
spread (OAS) calculations  (33).
Inferred-rating methodologies infer a credit rating for the 
ABS from an analysis of the underlying collateral, the col-
lateral manager and any credit/liquidity enhancements. 
The inferred ratings are then used to price the ABS off 
similarly rated ﬁ  xed-income securities.
An ABS’s OAS represents an approximation of its yield 
compensation for its combination of credit and liquidity, 
plus, in some cases, prepayment risk. The OAS pricing 
approach (the accuracy of which, to our knowledge, has 
never been empirically tested), described in such practi-
tioner publications as Hayre (2001), involves a three-step 
process :
• Project all of the ABS cash ﬂ  ows, including scheduled 
amortization, coupons and prepayments.
• Discount the projected cash ﬂ  ows using the appropriate 
discount rate (a spot rate inferred from either a govern-
ment bond or swap yield curve) plus a constant spread 
(across all maturities).
• If the total present value so calculated equals the ABS’s 
price, the spread chosen is the OAS. If not, an iterative 
process is followed until the OAS is determined.
Mahadevan and Schwartz (2001) identify three broad 
types of CDO pricing methodologies :
• Re-rating methodologies that infer a credit rating for 
the CDO from the ratings of its constituent parts and 
the relationships between them, which is then used to 
price the CDO off similarly rated bonds and CDOs  (34). 
For example, Cifuentes and O’Connor (1996) describe 
the process used by Moody’s, and how they calculate 
“diversity scores” by which the analysis of a portfolio of 
correlated assets is effectively simpliﬁ  ed into an analysis 
of a portfolio of uncorrelated assets .(35)
• Market value methodologies that essentially equate 
the CDO price to the sum of the market values of the 
constituent parts. Dufﬁ  e and Garleanu (2001) present 
such a model, although Mashal (2002) says that such 
risk-neutral  “reverse-engineering” models are fun-
damentally  ﬂ   awed, because of the large size of the 
non-default risk components embedded in the prices 
of typical corporate credits.
• Cash  ﬂ  ow methodologies, much like the ABS OAS 
approach described earlier, that involve discounting 
back simulated future cash ﬂ  ows. Mina (2002) presents 
a case study of such an approach.
Although none of these models has been subject to rigor-
ous empirical testing, there is a fairly extensive investment 
banking “literature” that focuses on the apparent “free 
lunch” in the CDO market, whereby CDOs trade consist-
ently cheap relative to corporate bonds of the same credit 
rating. Most point to the relative illiquidity of CDOs versus 
corporate bonds as the main reason, but King (2002) posits 
that some of this may relate to an imperfection in the 
market for corporate bonds that the CDO tranching proc-
ess arbitrages. Basically, it is said that the market overprices 
very low-rated and very high-rated corporate bonds due to 
a market segmentation effect which puts many investors at 
the extreme ends of the credit risk spectrum. (That is, many 
are constrained to buy only “AA” rated loans and bonds, 
while many others are constrained to buy exclusively high-
yield assets.) Hence, assets rated “A” through “BB” trade 
with larger illiquidity premia. In the CDO portfolio creation 
and tranching process, these “surplus” illiquidity premia 
can be shared amongst the high-grade and high-yield 
tranches, and the originating bank.
Most of these rationales would apply to synthetic CDOs, 
although, as shown in Goodman (2002), enhanced oppor-
tunities for regulatory arbitrage (versus “cash” CDOs) could 
provide an even larger surplus to spread around.
Most of the recent multi-name credit derivative pricing 
literature basically reﬁ  nes the techniques put forward by 
Li (2000), which uses the method of copulas to model 
the connections between the marginal default probability 
distributions of the underlying credit risks. (For example, 
see Frey et al. 2001, and Mashal and Naldi, 2002.)
3.3  Documentation and counterparty risks
As indicated above, market prices for CRT instruments 
should reﬂ  ect (beyond credit risk) counterparty and docu-
mentation risk.
(33) Prior to the development of OAS-type ABS pricing methodologies market prac-
titioners used “average life” approaches, whereby some sort of average prepay-
ment parameters were used to determine a single cash ﬂ  ow vector that was then 
discounted back using risk-free spot rates (Dunn and McConnell, 1981).
(34) Some controversy has arisen as to how Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s treat CDO 
assets that they have not themselves rated. Lyon (2002) describes how these two 
agencies take off up to four rating “notches” (for example, one “notch” being 
from “A+” to “A” on the S&P scale) from another agency’s rating, for CDO  rating 
inferral purposes. Fitch, whose ratings are often the brunt of such “notching”, has 
accused Moody’s and S&P of uncompetitive practices.
(35) As an alternative to the “diversity score” approach, Davis and Lo (1999) develop 
an “infectious default” contagion model  of default correlation. 138
Counterparty risks include the risk that the protection 
seller (unintentionally) defaults on required payments once 
a credit event is triggered or that the lender/protection 
buyer defaults on the payment of premia.
As regards settlement, two aspects are worth underlining :
• The timing of payments from CRT instruments can 
have an impact on the liquidity of the protection 
buyer. Whether CRT instruments are funded or 
unfunded obviously plays a role, as does the nature 
of the trigger events. CDSs may have broader deﬁ  ni-
tions of credit events than some other instruments, 
and payments may be triggered prior to the point at 
which the borrower defaults. Settlement following 
trigger events also inﬂ  uences the timing of payments. 
Instruments that allow the protection seller to inves-
tigate losses will imply slower repayment than those 
which do not.
• The amount of payment is determined both by settle-
ment following trigger events and associated coun-
terparty risks. Unfunded instruments leave open the 
possibility of counterparty default. Among unfunded 
instruments, those which provide more freedom for 
the protection seller to contest the claim embody a 
greater risk than those which require payment upon the 
triggering of the credit event.
Along these lines, documentation (or legal) risks 
represent an important category of risks that is funda-
mentally linked to the incomplete contracting nature of 
credit protection contracts  : at the time the contract is 
written it is impossible to envisage or to contract upon 
all possible future contingencies. As a consequence, 
unanticipated situations sometimes arise ex post (for 
example, once a credit event is triggered) in which one 
party has an incentive to act opportunistically  (36). This 
implies that CRT instrument documentation may entail 
differences in the degree of credit risk exposure from 
that embodied in the underlying asset (Tolk, 2001 and 
Merritt et al., 2001)
The nature of trigger events will have an inﬂ  uence on 
the severity of documentation risks. CDSs often involve 
“soft” default clauses, which are much broader than 
“the common understanding of default” (see Tolk, 2001 
and Merritt et al, 2001). The soft default clauses include 
restructuring and acceleration clauses. As noted by Tolk 
and Merritt et al, standard default swap restructuring 
event deﬁ   nitions fail to differentiate between “good” 
and  “bad” restructuring. In addition, the acceleration 
event is particularly problematic because it is an event 
that the lender (i.e., risk shedder) can trigger.
In contrast, ﬁ  nancial guarantees have narrowly deﬁ  ned 
default events. However, documentation risk can be par-
ticularly severe when ﬁ  nancial guarantees are hedged 
with CDSs (Kessler and Levenstein, 2001). Although 
these risks can be mitigated by tight documentation 
and objective mechanisms for verifying loss determina-
tions, there may nevertheless be systemic concerns, 
to the extent that risk is being transferred out of the 
banking sector (which concentrates the experience and 
expertise in such matters). In addition, documentation 
risk for products which experience rapid development 
(with increasing underlying exposures) could be cause 
for concern  (37).
Another common type of documentation risk arises 
through the settlement of the CRT contract when 
there is room for interpretation as regards the nature 
of deliverable assets. It is indeed in the lender’s interest 
to deliver the cheapest assets he can ﬁ  nd to the protec-
tion seller. In particular, recent cases have shown that 
it remains unclear whether convertible obligations are 
deliverable or not, due to their contingent nature.
(36) Problems such as these are sometimes referred to as incomplete contracting prob-
lems.
(37) Cebenoyan and Strahan (2001) attempt to show empirically that banks that are 
more active in loan sales markets tend to take on more underlying risk than those 
that do not. Demsetz (2000) has also shown that smaller banks that lack good 
opportunities for diversiﬁ  ed originations are more likely to be big loan sellers.
TABLE 3 POTENTIAL CRT RISK MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Potential Problem Instrument characteristics offering 
potential solutions
Counterparty risk: 
protection seller defaults 
on contingent payouts or buyer 
defaults on premia




• Use of funded CRTs
Documentation risk: 
“credit event” definitions 
do not completely cover 
all potential risks
• Careful documentation 
and solid understanding 
of CRT dynamics
Basis risk: 
hedge imperfections caused 
by funding cost differentials, 
delivery options and regulations
Market risk: 
bundled interest rate 
and currency risks 
(only on CLNs 
and funded CDOs)
• Use other derivatives 
to unbundle other risks139
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The relevancy and importance of other risks vary 
depending on the instrument :
-  CDSs, credit insurance, ﬁ  nancial guarantee insurance, 
surety bonds, and bank guarantees do not embody 
additional market risk but they do entail counterparty, 
documentation and basis risks.
-  CLNs and CDOs may reduce or eliminate counterparty 
and documentation risk, but they do embody market 
and basis risk.
However, it is still not clear whether these additional risks 
are really reﬂ  ected in observable CRT prices. For instance, 
it is not rare that CDS prices are very close (if not identical) 
to asset swap prices.
4.  Could CRT markets have macro-
ﬁ  nancial implications ?
4.1  Can CRT have an impact on the overall 
amount of credit in the system ?
Beyond their effects on micro  -  relationships, CRT instru-
ments could have an impact on the overall access to 
ﬁ  nancing at a macro level. At ﬁ  rst glance, however, the 
overall impact of CRT instruments on borrowers’ access 
to ﬁ  nancing (as a whole, as it is relevant both on the loan 
market and on the bond market) is unclear.
4.1.1  More available credit ?
CRT instruments may have a positive impact for bor-
rowers in enlarging the potential population of “lend-
ers” because in principle they allow new investors (such 
as insurance companies) to take on credit risk to which 
they would not have had access before. For a given 
level of imperfect information, a greater demand for 
credit risk resulting from the existence of CRT instru-
ments could allow borrowers to beneﬁ  t from extended 
ﬁ   nancing opportunities and thus reduce the risk of 
credit rationing (see Box in Section 2). At a ﬁ  rst stage, 
this may occur whatever the credit quality; lenders 
would be more willing to grant credit, as they would 
dispose of larger possibilities of hedging  /  transfer. At 
a second stage, the price of protection itself would be 
expected to decrease, insofar as competition among 
protection sellers would intensify. Larger and  /  or 
cheaper access to liquidity would also reduce the risk 
of elimination of the safest borrowers. To this extent, 
CRT instruments would complete the market for credit 
risk and increase its efﬁ  ciency.
CRT markets could also have an impact on the way 
monetary policy exerts its effects on credit distribution. 
For example, an empirical analysis (Estrella, 2002) shows 
that mortgage securitisation has made US output less 
sensitive to monetary policy. In the spirit of the Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995) bank-lending-channel monetary policy 
transmission mechanism theory, Estrella posits that securi-
tisation mutes the impact that monetary policy tightening 
is supposed to have on banks’ ability to fund themselves 
and to provide loans. However, Stanton (2002) warns 
that this conclusion cannot be automatically extended 
to all securitisation activity, as there are reasons to sus-
pect that the impact of non-mortgage securitisation 
would be different. For example, Stanton (1998) and 
Minton et al. (1999) show that banks and industrial 
ﬁ   rms securitise more during recessions, whereas mort-
gage securitisation tends to decline during recessions. In 
fact, Stanton (1998) goes on to say that “procyclicality 
differences in lending activity should become less severe 
as markets for securitised loans develop.”
4.1.2  Or risks of restriction of the loan channel ?
CRT instruments may, however, entail some drawbacks 
(and reduce the market’s efﬁ  ciency) for borrowers’ ﬁ  nanc-
ing, insofar as they could trigger a fundamental change in 
the functioning of the loan market. If banks move from an 
“originating and holding” attitude to one of “originating 
and transferring”, credit distribution would be determined 
by the possibilities of hedging on the CRT market.
• One can therefore ask whether lending conditions by 
banks – and credit distribution to the economy as a 
whole  – would not endure increased pressure from 
market - linked factors. As shown in Section 3, although 
credit risk pricing methods have recently advanced, they 
remain imperfect and are often difﬁ  cult and costly to 
implement. As a result, liquidity conditions – either for 
a given CRT instrument or more generally for the whole 
market segment – play a key role in forming prices of 
CRT instruments. Such prices may thus prove highly 
volatile. If these prices inﬂ  uence lending conditions, the 
impact of ﬁ  nancial market strains on the business cycle 
could be magniﬁ  ed.
• In addition, if loan prices were to be determined as a 
function of hedging costs, not only could loan prices 
become more volatile, but loans themselves could 
become more expensive and scarce and the scope of 
available  ﬁ   nancing might be reduced. Such develop-
ments could thus reduce the speciﬁ   city of the loan 
market versus the bond market. As previously men-
tioned (see also Diamond, 1991), when asymmetric 
information exists, young, small, nonrated or poorly 140
rated ﬁ  rms rely on loan ﬁ  nancing  − in order to beneﬁ  t 
from reputation effects  − before coming to the market 
and issuing bonds. If bank loans were to become more 
similar to marketable instruments and more closely 
resemble classic bonds, such ﬁ  rms  might  experience 
additional difﬁ   culties for their ﬁ   nancing. The cost of 
loans (which are already higher than market ﬁ  nancing 
due to monitoring costs) would further increase, which 
might lead to some renewed form of credit rationing.
4.2  Resilience of the global ﬁ  nancial system
4.2.1  Interactions between CRT and other markets : more 
or less overall protection?  (38)
The discussion in Sections 1  and 2  has noted that 
whereas CRT markets help to “complete incomplete” 
credit markets, individual CRT instruments embody dif-
fering characteristics and thus vary in their impacts on 
ﬁ  nancial markets. This suggests that the introduction of 
a new type of CRT instrument can have an impact not 
only on the underlying market for loans or bonds but also 
on the markets for other CRT instruments. Along these 
lines, Morrison (2002) notes that according to practition-
ers, credit derivatives possess two advantages compared 
with secondary loan markets : ﬁ  rst, they facilitate portfolio 
diversiﬁ  cation management as they are more easily traded 
and, second, they protect relationships rents, as their use 
is unobservable.
Duffee and Zhou (2001) offer one of the rare studies of 
interactions between CRT markets. These authors analyse 
the effect of introducing a market for credit default swaps 
when a market for loan sales already exists. One difference 
in the characteristics of CDSs and loan sales drives the 
results; namely, loan sales (without recourse) transfer credit 
risk for the full term of the loan, while CDSs allow credit 
protection to be purchased for a shorter period than the 
entire life of the loan. As noted in Section 2, this difference 
can be important if the problem of asymmetric information 
between the lender and protection seller varies over the life 
of the loan. Duffee and Zhou assume that the quality of 
the borrower (which is known to the lender but not to the 
protection seller) has no effect on the borrower’s default 
probability during the early period of the loan but does 
affect the default probability later in the life of the loan. 
Thus, credit protection through a CDS can be purchased 
during the early time period without giving rise to adverse 
selection (as explained in Section 2.1.1).
Under these assumptions, the introduction of a CDS 
market can have a signiﬁ  cant impact on equilibrium in the 
loan sale market. In some cases, the introduction of a CDS 
market will result in a reduction in the overall amount of 
loans that are sold, and the average quality of loans sold 
will also be lower. For those loans which would have been 
sold in the absence of the CDS market, the lender now uses 
a CDS to purchase protection during the early period of 
the loan. However, because the CDS only covers a portion 
of the life of the loan, the total amount of credit protec-
tion purchased is now less than it would have been in the 
absence of the CDS market. In other cases, introduction 
of the CDS market allows protection to be purchased in 
the early period for loans for which no sale would have 
occurred in the absence of the CDS market. In this case, 
the CDS market causes the total amount of credit protec-
tion to increase, since loans for which CDSs are used would 
not have been sold in the absence of such instruments. The 
ultimate effect on welfare of the introduction of the CDS 
market will thus depend upon the relative importance of 
each of these cases.
4.2.2 Interactions between CRT and other markets  : 
impact on reference assets and entities
A great deal of market commentary has focused on 
the impact of CRT markets on the underlying reference 
assets and entities. For example, front-running arbi-
trage CDO managers have been said to narrow credit 
spreads on the bonds that they accumulate ahead of 
issuance  (39). On the other hand, some market partici-
pants have accused hedge funds of aggressively selling 
synthetic credit risk protection, in order to push credits 
that are barely investment grade (“BBB +” and above 
on the Standard & Poor’s credit rating scale) into the 
speculative-grade rating range (“BB +” and below)  (40). 
Under such circumstances, many institutional investors 
are forced to liquidate bonds that drop through the 
investment-grade threshold, thereby accelerating credit 
spread widening and making their short positions more 
valuable. However, this implies that CDS premia move-
ments  cause bond yield spread movements, and that 
furthermore, credit rating agencies take their leads from 
market spread movements.
In fact, several recent empirical studies of CDS 
premia and bond yield spreads indicate that CDS 
premia movements lead bond yield spread move-
ments. However, this does not necessarily point to 
a causal link between the two markets. As pointed 
out in Blanco et al. (2002), “price discovery will 
take place where relative costs are lower and where 
(38)  At a latter stage, the adequacy of capital requirements for banks moving from 
primary warehousers of credit risk to diversiﬁ  ed originators and distributors should 
be addressed (see Froot, 2001).
(39) “Balance sheet” CDOs are initiated by the holders of the assets, whereas “arbi-
trage” CDOs are driven by asset managers and investors.
(40) For example, see Sender (2003).141
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trade is easier”  – i.e. in the CDS market. Also the 
results of Brousseau and Michaud (2002) and Hull 
et al.  (2002) suggest that the linkage is somewhat 
asymmetric – when spreads are widening, CDS premia 
lead bond yield spreads; when spreads are narrowing, 
they tend to move more closely together. This is con-
sistent with the fact that “betting” on spread widening 
in the CDS market is much cheaper and easier than 
in the cash market, where bond short selling is often 
hampered by illiquidity in corporate bond lending and 
repo markets.
4.2.3  More dispersion of credit risk ?
In 2001 and 2002, the global ﬁ  nancial system was faced 
with a series of shocks  : the ﬁ  rst synchronised slowdown 
of the globalisation era  ; September 11 terrorist attacks  ; 
and continued bursting of the equity bubble. Among 
the explanations advanced regarding the resilience of 
the system was that CRT had allowed a better dispersion 
of credit risk (IMF, 2002; BIS, 2002b  ; several speeches of 
ofﬁ  cials at the US Federal Reserve -including A. Greenspan 
and R. Ferguson ; Persaud, 2002).
As shown in previous sections, CRT markets potentially 
allow for a broadening of the population of end risk 
holders as well as extended portfolio diversiﬁ  cation. To 
this extent, they could have helped ﬁ  nancial intermedi-
aries mitigate risk and thus could have played a role in 
reducing systemic risk. Moreover, at the current develop-
ing stage of CRT markets, one can even assume that the 
total amount of outstanding credit risk is increasing at a 
slower pace than the growing capacity of ultimate risk 
bearers, which may have resulted in a decrease in the 
average exposure of investors to credit risk.
On the other hand, one must bear in mind three poten-
tial risks. First, there exists a high degree of concentra-
tion in intermediation on CRT markets, which could 
mean that even credit risk brokers could be faced 
with signiﬁ  cant residual credit risk exposures (due, for 
instance, to potential hedging mismatches). Second, as 
shown by existing public data, CRT markets remain to 
a large extent inter-banking markets. Although likely to 
increase as the market develops, the portion of non-
bank investors who take on credit risk is at present very 
limited. As a result, the “dispersion” argument should 
not be overstated. Furthermore, as noted in IMF (2002) 
and BIS (2002b) regulatory arbitrage preoccupations 
could have resulted in a concentration of credit risk in 
lesser capitalised institutions (including SPVs) entailing 
reputational risks for their promoters. Third, a disper-
sion of credit risk among a larger population of end 
investors may reduce systemic risk only to a certain 
extent : were these investors to face repeated defaults, 
their resulting ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties could exert negative 
pressure on the business cycle and hence on ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries themselves.
4.2.4  Less transparency as regards who bears credit risk ?
As pointed out in IMF (2002) and CGFS (2003), credit 
risk transfer instruments “can reduce the transparency 
about who owns credit risk” and result in more difﬁ  cult 
counterparty and credit risk assessment. The BIS (2002a) 
report on bank disclosure and the CGFS CRT report (2003) 
identiﬁ  ed a number of areas where the reporting of CRT 
activity by banks was lacking. “Pillar 3” of the proposed 
new Basel Accord (see BIS, 2001) may resolve this prob-
lem for regulated banks. However, non-bank disclosure 
standards will still leave much to be desired. Although 
ﬁ   nancial accounting standards setters appear to be in 
the process of tightening the rules for removing assets 
from the balance sheet via credit risk transfer, there may   
remain shortfalls in the reporting of how the removal is 
achieved.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the micro and macro-level 
effects of markets for credit risk transfer and their 
potential ﬁ   nancial stability implications. At the micro 
level, CRT instruments provide beneﬁ  ts  to  ﬁ  nancial 
institutions in managing their credit risk, yet these 
instruments also alter the nature of relationships 
among ﬁ  nancial market players and, as a result, intro-
duce new asymmetric information and risk manage-
ment problems. These problems − such as weaker 
incentives on the part of banks to screen and monitor 
borrowers or increases in counterparty risk − can be 
mitigated to greater or lesser degrees via the choice of 
CRT instrument. Nevertheless, the problems can raise 
ﬁ   nancial stability concerns if not properly addressed. 
In addition, pricing of CRT instruments remains difﬁ  -
cult, which raises the prospect that CRT prices do not 
adequately reﬂ  ect the risk.
At a macro level, CRT markets have the potential of 
dispersing credit risk. While there is evidence that CRT 
markets have moved some credit risk out of the banking 
sector, the true degree of dispersion achieved via these 
markets is at present unknown. In addition, intermedia-
tion in CRT markets is highly concentrated.
CRT markets may also affect the total availability of 
credit, but the effect may go in either direction. On 
the one hand, the enhanced ability of banks to transfer 142
credit risk off their balance sheets may increase their will-
ingness and ability to lend. On the other hand, if banks 
monitor borrowers less as a result of purchasing credit 
protection, lesser known ﬁ  rms may lose their “bank cer-
tiﬁ  cation” beneﬁ  ts and, in turn, access to certain forms 
of ﬁ  nance.
Given the growing importance of CRT markets and their 
rapid expected future expansion, the potential of these 
markets to affect ﬁ  nancial stability is likely to increase 
over time. Improved disclosure of CRT activities would 
go a long way toward enabling market observers to 
judge their true impact.143
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APPENDIX A KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE-NAME CREDIT RISK TRANSFER INSTRUMENTS (41)
(41) This table was developed on the basis of CGFS (2003) Appendix 3, Instrument Characteristics.
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Credit linked note 
(CLN)
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delivery of an 
obligation of the 
borrower by the 
risk shedder to the 
risk taker in 
exchange for its 
face value in cash; 
occasionally
through
establishment of a 
market price for 
the borrower’s 
debt following the 
credit event (e.g. 
by polling dealers) 
and cash payment 
of the difference 
between this value 
and the debt’s 
face value
Typically through 
establishment of a 
market price for 
the borrower’s 
debt following the 
credit event (e.g. 
by polling dealers) 
and payment of 
the difference 
between this value 
and the face value 
of the debt. This 
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deducted from the 
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Credit default swap 
(CDS)
Credit linked note 
(CLN)

















protection seller up 
to potential 
settlement amount
Exposed to risk 
that high-quality 
collateral pool, 







protection seller up 
to potential 
settlement amount 
but risk mitigated 
by periodic 
payments to reflect 
changes in market 
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Not managed Collateral support 
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No (except risk 
shedder may be 
long a delivery 
option, which may 
have value if the 
borrower’s
liabilities differ in 
value following 
credit event)
The note may pay 
a fixed or floating 
interest rate in 
addition to the 
cashflows on the 
embedded single 
name default swap
Credit risk bundled 
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linked, e.g. interest 
rate, fx or equity 
risk
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APPENDIX B KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTI-NAME CREDIT RISK TRANSFER INSTRUMENTS
Basket credit default swap Collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO)





Pays regular premia over 
life of swap; receives 
contingent payment upon 
nth default
Receives loan/bond 
market values up front 
from special purpose 
entity (SPE). May retain 
residual interests 
(e.g., equity tranche)
Pays regular premia over 
life of swap; receives 
contingent amounts from 
SPE upon credit events. 
May retain residual 
interests
(e.g., equity tranche)
Receives loan market 
values up front from SPE. 









Receives regular premia 
over life of swap; pays 
contingent amount 
following nth default
SPE receives all 
subsequent loan/bond 
cashflows, less any fees 
paid to managers and 
enhancers
SPE issues various 
securities and invests 
proceeds in high-quality 
collateral
(e.g. US Treasuries)
SPE receives all 
subsequent loan 
cashflows, less any fees 




No Yes if loans/bonds were 





ISDA standard credit 
events (bankruptcy, 
obligation default, failure 
to pay, restructuring) – 
may also include 
repudiation for sovereigns 
and obligation 
acceleration in trades 
based on ‘old’ ISDA 
standards
Not applicable ISDA standard credit 
events (bankruptcy, 
obligation default, failure 
to pay, restructuring) – 
may also include 
repudiation for sovereigns 
and obligation 
acceleration in trades 






Typically through delivery 
of an obligation of the 
borrower by the risk 
shedder to the risk taker 
in exchange for its face 
value in cash; occasionally 
through establishment of 
a market price for the 
borrower’s debt following 
the credit event (e.g. by 
polling dealers) and cash 
payment of the difference 
between this value and 
the debt’s face value
Not applicable Typically through delivery 
of an obligation of the 
borrower by the risk 
shedder to the risk taker 
in exchange for its face 
value in cash; occasionally 
through establishment of 
a market price for the 
borrower’s debt following 
the credit event (e.g. by 
polling dealers) and cash 
payment of the difference 
between this value and 





Exposed to protection 
seller up to potential 
settlement amount






Exposed to protection 
buyer for transaction 
replacement cost
Exposed to risk of 
collateral and portfolio 
mismanagement
Exposed to risk of 
collateral and portfolio 
mismanagement
Exposed to risk of 
collateral mismanagement
How these are 
typically managed?




and excess spread traps
Structural enhancements 
like over-collateralization 




Any other risks 
bundled?
No (except risk shedder 
may be long a delivery 
option, which may have 
value if the borrower’s 
liabilities differ in value 
following credit event)
SPE may be exposed to 
basis mismatches 
between the underlying 
asset (the loans) and the 
securities issued.
SPE may be exposed to 
basis mismatches 
between the high-quality 
collateral, contingent 
payouts and the securities 
issued
SPE may be exposed to 
basis mismatches 
between the underlying 
asset (the loans) and the 
securities issued146
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